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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENTS UNDER
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT-PRISONER-DRIVEN CONFINEMENT CONDI-
TION CLAIMs-The United States Supreme Court has held that in
order for a confinement condition claim to violate the Eighth
Amendment, the prisoner must demonstrate that the complained
of condition was a violation of the Eighth Amendment and that
prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of such violative conditions.
Wilson v Seiter, US , 111 S Ct 2321 (1991).
On August 28, 1986, Pearly L. Wilson, an Ohio inmate,' filed suit
under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 2 against Richard P.
Seiter and Carl Humphreys5 (hereinafter "prison officials"), alleg-
ing that certain confinement conditions4 existing within the Hock-
ing Correctional Facility (hereinafter "HCF") violated the Eighth
1. Wilson v Seiter, US , 111 S Ct 2321, 2322 (1991). Wilson was incarcerated at
the Hocking Correctional Facility, a medium security facility located in Nelsonville, Ohio.
Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2322.
2. Id. The suit was filed under 42 USC § 1983, which provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Con-
gress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
42 USC § 1983 (1979).
3. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2321, 2322. The suit named both Richard P. Seiter, Director
of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, and Carl Humphreys, Warden of
Hocking Correctional Facility, as co-defendants. Id at 2322.
4. Id. See note 6 and accompanying text.
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and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.,
The complaint averred that confinement conditions such as inade-
quate heating and cooling, overcrowding, and being housed with
mentally and physically ill inmates violated Wilson's Eighth
Amendment rights.6 Wilson's complaint sought declaratory and in-
junctive relief as well as $900,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages.
7
Both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment8 and in-
cluded supporting affidavits with their motions. 9 Wilson argued
two primary assertions: (1) that the confinement conditions were
violations of the Eighth Amendment, and (2) that after Wilson no-
tified prison officials of the violative conditions, the prison officials
failed to take remedial actions.10 The affidavit filed on behalf of
the prison officials refuted the existence of several of Wilson's enu-
merated conditions and outlined efforts taken by prison officials
within HCF to improve physical and medical conditions of
confinement."
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
prison officials, initially finding that it was incumbent upon the
5. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2322. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
US Const, Amend VIII.
The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
The Supreme Court in Robinson u California, 370 US 660, 667 (1962), held that the
Eighth Amendment applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
6. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2322. Wilson also enumerated other confinement condi-
tions-excessive noise, inadequate storage areas, and unsanitary restroom and dining facili-
ties-as being violative of his Eighth Amendment rights. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The Court may enter summary judgment in a movant's favor upon a showing
that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." FRCP 56(c).
9. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2322.
10. Id.
11. Wilson v Seiter, 893 F2d 866 (6th Cir 1990). The factual record showed that re-
medial actions taken by prison officials included specific measures to reduce noise levels,
heaters were serviced, prison officials provided prisoners with extra blankets during cold
months, installed exhaust fans for better ventilation, required daily cleaning of restrooms
and dining facilities, and hired an exterminator to combat vermin on a twice-monthly basis.
Wilson, 893 F2d at 866.
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states to furnish inmates with "reasonably adequate" necessities
such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and per-
sonal safety from violent offenders. 2 The district court applied the
substantive law gleaned from Whitley v Albers,'3 which held that
in order to successfully set forth an Eighth Amendment claim, a
prisoner must demonstrate that the prison officials unnecessarily
and wantonly inflicted pain by acting "maliciously and sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm."1
4
The district court dismissed Wilson's specific allegations con-
cerning confinement with physically ill prisoners, the general sani-
tary conditions, noise levels, and inadequate heating and cooling as
not violative of his Eighth Amendment rights.' 5 The district court
concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate that the prison offi-
cials "sadistically or maliciously" inflicted the remaining condi-
tions on him "with the very purpose of causing harm" as required
by Whitley.' 6
Wilson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit.' 7 In affirming the district court's decision, the court
of appeals agreed with the district court's use of the Whitley in-
tent standard, but found that the district court erred in its finding
that certain confinement conditions did not violate the Eighth
Amendment.18 The court of appeals examined the confinement
12. Id at 861, 863. The suit was first heard in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, Judge James L. Graham presiding. Id at 861.
13. 475 US 312 (1986). In Whitley, a prisoner shot by a prison guard during an at-
tempt to put down a prison insurrection alleged that he had been subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment. Whitley, 475 US at 312-15. The Court held that a prisoner must
demonstrate that prison officials unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain or punishment
by acting "maliciously and sadistically with the very purpose of causing harm." Id at 320.
The Court ruled that this standard of intent on the part of prison officials was required to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id at 319, 320.
14. Id at 320.
15. Wilson, 893 F2d at 863. The district court dismissed confinement conditions of
being housed with physically ill prisoners, general sanitation, noise levels, heating and cool-
ing, and ventilation as meritless in the face of the prison officials' affidavit in support of
their motion for summary judgment. Id. The Court based this conclusion on the prison
officials' attempts to ameliorate the complained-of conditions. See note 11.
16. Wilson, 893 F2d at 863.
17. Id at 862. The case was heard before Circuit Judges Krupansky and Wellford,
and District Judge Harvey, United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan, sitting by designation. Id.
18. Id at 864. The court of appeals found that the district court erred when it
adopted the findings outlined in the prison officials' affidavit. Id. The court of appeals deter-
mined that the district court erroneously weighed and decided the truthfulness of the alle-
gations contained in the submitted affidavits instead of following the more correct proce-
dure of identifying whether or not the conditions were genuine issues of material fact. Id.
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conditions enumerated by Wilson to determine whether such con-
ditions were genuine issues of material fact.1" The court of appeals
looked to the reasoning in Rhodes v Chapman2 0 and found that
some of the confinement conditions were of the type "suggestive"
of Eighth Amendment violations,21 but stated that Wilson's spe-
cific claims regarding inadequate cooling, overcrowding, and being
housed with mentally ill prisoners did not reach the level as to se-
riously deprive him of his Eighth Amendment rights.2 2
The court of appeals concluded that the district court correctly
applied the Whitley standard and agreed with the district court
that Wilson failed to demonstrate that the prison officials unneces-
sarily or wantonly inflicted the remaining conditions..2  This hold-
ing was founded upon the court of appeals' conclusion that Wilson
The court of appeals stated that the "judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial." Id.
19. Id. The court of appeals determined that, in order to decide whether or not the
confinement conditions amounted to genuine issues of material fact, an examination of the
substantive law regarding Eighth Amendment confinement conditions claims was required.
Id.
20. 452 US 337 (1981). The prisoners in Rhodes contended that the housing of two
prisoners in a cell designed for one prisoner constituted cruel and unusual punishment.
Rhodes, 452 US at 337-42. The Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding that Eighth
Amendment violations are measured by "evolving standards of decency" and that confine-
ment conditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain. Id at 346,
347.
21. Wilson, 893 F2d at 864. The court of appeals stated that after the Rhodes deci-
sion, courts were now required to examine the conditions in their "totality" and not merely
on an isolated basis. Rhodes, 452 US at 347. Judge Harvey was careful to point out that,
although in extreme circumstances the totality may amount to an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion, there must still exist a specific condition on which to base the Eighth Amendment
claim. Wilson, 893 F2d at 864, citing Walker v Mintzes, 771 F2d 920, 925 (6th Cir 1985).
Specific conditions found to have violated prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights include:
denial of access to shower facilities, Preston v Thompson, 589 F2d 300 (7th Cir 1978); denial
of medical treatment, Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97 (1976); overcrowding, Cody v Hilliard,
799 F2d 447 (8th Cir 1986); threats to safety, French v Owens, 777 F2d 1250 (7th Cir 1985);
vermin infestation, Hoptowit v Spellman, 753 F2d 779 (9th Cir 1985); inadequate ventila-
tion, id; and unsanitary eating conditions, Ramos v Lamm, 639 F2d 559 (10th Cir 1980).
22. Wilson, 893 F2d at 865. The court of appeals based this conclusion on its findings
that: (1) there was no precedent holding that a prisoner subjected to high summer tempera-
tures was constitutionally violative, (2) there was no objective risk to prisoners being housed
with mentally ill prisoners, since there were no reported incidents of violence or danger, and
(3) although double-bunked with less than fifty square feet of personal space, the prisoners
were not overcrowded because they had available to them a television room, gymnasium,
yard, weight room, billiards table, and library. Id at 861, 865.
23. Id at 866. The court cautiously stated that, although state-of-mind was not usu-
ally a proper issue for resolution on summary judgment, they must at least perform a cur-
sory inquiry to establish whether or not Wilson's affidavit, at a minimum, implied that the
prison officials acted with the requisite intent. Id.
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failed to assert or even imply in his complaint or subsequent
pleadings that the prison officials acted "maliciously or sadistically
for the very purpose of causing harm.
'24
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated
the Sixth Circuit's decision, and remanded the case to the lower
court to apply the correct standard of intent.2 5 Justice Scalia for-
mulated the issues before the Court as whether a prisoner, when
alleging that conditions of confinement constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment, must show a culpable state of mind on the part
of prison officials and, if so, what state of mind is required.2 The
Court fixated on the intent issue and expressed no opinion as to
the Sixth Circuit's finding that some, but not all, of the confine-
ment conditions were "suggestive" of Eighth Amendment viola-
tions. The Court determined that confinement conditions claims
could not be defined as punishment formally meted out by statute
or judicial resolve;28 therefore, the Court concluded that the valid-
ity of such an Eighth Amendment claim necessarily depended
upon a showing that the prison officials intended to unnecessarily
24. Id.
25. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2321. Certiorari granted in Wilson v Seiter, US , 111 S Ct
41 (1990).
26. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2321. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Id at
2322.
27. Id at 2327. Although the Court did not express an opinion as to the Sixth Cir-
cuit's determination on the constitutionality of the complained-of conditions, the Court ex-
plained that for a totality of conditions to reach the Eighth Amendment threshold, the con-
ditions must be mutually reinforcing (such as no heat combined with no extra blankets). Id.
Justice Scalia defined the confinement conditions examination by the courts as an objec-
tive inquiry of the claim to be governed by the holding in Rhodes. Id. The objective inquiry
is a preliminary matter that must be addressed prior to the Court's reaching the subjective
inquiry (standard of intent). Id.
The Court described the objective test by relying on its earlier opinion in Rhodes, which
held: "Only deprivations denying the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities are suf-
ficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation." Id, citing Rhodes, 452
US at 346.
28. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2323-26. The Court rationalized that intent was implicit in
the term punishment. Id at 2326. The Court determined that if punishment inflicted was
not formally meted out, either as required by statute or sentence, some mental intent must
be attributable to it. Id at 2325.
Wilson argued that confinement condition cases such as his were distinguishable from
"one-time" infliction cases such as Whitley. Id at 2322. Wilson conceded that the "one-
time" infliction of punishment cases required the prisoner to demonstrate intent on the part
of the prison officials. Id. However, Wilson argued, confinement conditions, which resulted
from "systematic" conditions that inflict punishment on all the prisoners and which are
endemic to the prison system as a whole, required no showing of intent if the conditions
themselves violate a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. Id at 2322-26.
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or wantonly inflict the violative conditions on the prisoner.29
Although the Court agreed with the court of appeals that a
showing of intent was paramount for a confinement conditions
case, it held that the Sixth Circuit erred when it applied the stan-
dard of "malicious and sadistic with the very purpose of causing
harm," and not the standard of "deliberate indifference" set forth
in Estelle v Gamble.30 The Court reasoned that the standard ap-
plied by the Sixth Circuit was overly harsh for confinement condi-
tions cases, and that the "deliberate indifference" standard
promulgated by Estelle was the correct standard for courts to
apply.31
The Court stated that the court of appeals' error could possibly
have been harmless, basing such a determination on the Sixth Cir-
cuit's finding that Wilson's claim established, at best, that the
prison officials acted with negligence.2 However, the Court con-
cluded that the Sixth Circuit could have conceivably reached a dif-
ferent conclusion under the correct standard and thus remanded
the case for reconsideration under the proper standard.33
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Ste-
vens, concurred in the judgment but expressed concern with the
majority's reasoning.34 The concurring Justices disagreed with the
29. Id at 2325, 2326.
30. Id at 2328, citing Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97 (1976). The Court narrowly distin-
guished the different prisoner-driven Eighth Amendment claims to explain the different in-
tent levels. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2327. The Sixth Circuit relied on the intent standard set
forth in Whitley (unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain by acting maliciously and sa-
distically for the very purpose of causing harm). Whitley, 475 US at 320. The Court found
this to be the wrong standard because Whitley involved prison officials acting "in haste" in
their attempt to quell a prison riot and Wilson involved a claim of inhumane conditions
which was more analogous to the inadequate medical care claim set forth in Estelle. Wilson,
111 S Ct at 2326-27.
The Court countered that the proper standard is found in Estelle. The Court in Estelle
held that the lack of adequate medical care could be a violation of the prisoner's Eighth
Amendment rights. Estelle, 429 US at 104. The Court defined such a challenge as a confine-
ment conditions case and concluded that a prisoner must demonstrate that the prison offi-
cials unnecessarily and wantonly inflicted pain or punishment through their "deliberate in-
difference." Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2326, 2327. The Court reasoned that Estelle was materially
synonymous to Wilson's claim in that both alleged that confinement conditions constituted
Eighth Amendment violations, thus the standard of "deliberate indifference" was synony-
mous to both claims. Id at 2327, 2328, citing Estelle, 429 US at 104. See note 77 for the facts
of Estelle.
31. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2327, 2328. See also note 30 and accompanying text.
32. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2328.
33. Id. The Court reasoned that if the Sixth Circuit had realized the significance of
the proper standard to be applied, they may have weighted Wilson's arguments more criti-
cally and come to a different resolution. Id.
34. Id (White concurring).
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holding that confinement conditions claims must demonstrate that
prison officials inflicted violative conditions with "deliberate indif-
ference.""5 Moreover, they stated that any intent requirement was
a departure from the Court's earlier decisions.38 Justice White hy-
pothesized that an intent standard would prove impossible to ap-
ply since most confinement conditions claims are cumulative in na-
ture, and prisoners would be required to show intent on the part of
officials that have since moved out of the prison system.3 7 Further-
more, the concurring Justices expressed concern that the major-
ity's holding now created a "fiscal defense" which, if asserted by
the prison officials, could negate the required intent by simply
showing the violative conditions were the result of inadequate
funding rather than deliberate indifference on the part of prison
officials.3" The concurring Justices found that the proper standard
for confinement conditions cases should be the requirement that
states abide by a "contemporary standard of decency" and not
force prisoners to undergo serious deprivations of life's necessities
in the futile search for deliberate indifference.39
35. Id.
36. Id. The concurring Justices relied upon the opinions cited in Estelle and Rhodes
which, Justice White maintained, did not require a showing of intent on the part of prison
officials in confinement conditions cases. Id at 2329, citing Estelle, 429 US at 104, and
Rhodes, 452 US at 347.
37. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2330. Justice White's concern was predicated on the theory
that many different officials, both inside and outside the prison system, may be responsible
for the confinement conditions, yet it may be impossible for the prisoner to pinpoint which
prison officials were primarily responsible. Id.
Justice White also offered the argument that a prisoner was challenging an institution,
and the ability to demonstrate intent on the part of a specific prison official was dubious at
best. Id.
38. Id at 2330, 2331.
39. Id at 2331. The concurring Justices relied on earlier opinions cited in DeShaney v
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 US 189 (1989), and Rhodes, 452 US at 347.
In DeShaney, the Court, when confronted with a confinement conditions challenge,
stated: "When a State has chosen imprisonment as a form of punishment, a State must
ensure that the conditions in its prison comport with the 'contemporary standards of de-
cency' required by the Eighth Amendment." DeShaney, 489 US at 198-200.
The concurrence further bolstered its concern with the majority's conclusion that intent
on the part of prison officials was necessary for a confinement conditions claim by citing
Rhodes: "No static test can exist by which courts determine whether conditions of confine-
ment are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth Amendment 'must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency' that mark the progress of a maturing society." Wilson, 111 S
Ct at 2330, citing Rhodes, 452 US as 346.
The majority stated that the concurring Justices erred by relying upon Rhodes, and ex-
plained that Rhodes was decided strictly upon "whether the conditions were a sufficiently
serious enough deprivation to violate the constitutional standard" and that Rhodes never
reached the subjective inquiry. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2325 n 2.
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Societal concerns for limiting cruel and unusual punishments
were first expressed in the Old Testament." The biblical laws
passed down to Moses included "lex talionis," which means "an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. 4 1 Early penal codes reflected
the biblical concern for equating the punishment rendered with
the offense committed by attempting to prohibit severe punish-
ments for trivial offenses. 42 The Magna Carta expanded this princi-
ple greatly, as Chapter 14 specifically set forth rudimentary restric-
tions prohibiting disproportionate punishments. 3
This history set the stage for the drafting of the Bill of Rights in
1689 by the English Parliament at the accession of William and
Mary.4" The English statute was primarily directed against punish-
ments meted out that were either unauthorized by law and beyond
the power of the sitting court, or punishments that were dispropor-
tionate to the offense committed.45 Most legal scholars agree that
our Founding Fathers undoubtedly borrowed the language from
the English Bill of Rights and included it in the Eighth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 6
40. Exodus 21:25.
41. Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The
Original Meaning, 57 Cal L Rev 839, 844 (1969).
42. Granucci, 57 Cal L Rev at 844 (cited in note 41), citing Leviticus 24:19-20. Profes-
sor Granucci wrote that early penal codes promulgated by the Saxons of Pre-Norman Eng-
land, the Germanic Tribes, and the Norse Vikings all reflected an adoption of the biblical
principle of equating punishment rendered with the offense committed. Granucci, 57 Cal L
Rev at 844-48 (cited in note 41). Professor Granucci found that the penal laws of the Ger-
manic peoples in the Middle Ages were enforced through a system of fixed penalties. Id at
844.
The Norse Vikings followed a similar system by listing each known crime and its appro-
priate punishment in the "Gulathing and Frusthathing Laws." Thamar E. Dufwa, The Vi-
king Laws and the Magna Carta 51-52 (Exposition, 1963). In ninth century England, the
laws under King Alfred codified the principle of "lex talionis" by prescribing fines in pro-
portional amounts to the offense committed. John P. Dawson, The Development of Law
and Legal Institution 44 (unpublished, Harvard Law School 1965).
43. James C. Holt, Magna Carta 323 (Cambridge, 1965). The basic premise was that
trivial offenses were not to be met with excessive punishment. Id.
44. 1 Wm & Mary 2d Sess, c 2 (1689). The language read in pertinent part: "Exces-
sive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual pun-
ishments inflicted." Id.
The English Bill of Rights was passed partly in response to prior laws allowing imprison-
ment and torture for trivial offenses. Granucci, 57 Cal L Rev at 844-48 (cited in note 41).
45. See note 44.
46. Granucci, 57 Cal L Rev at 840 (cited in note 41). There has been great debate as
to whether the cruel an unusual punishment language in the English Bill of Rights was a
response to excessive or illegal punishments, as a reaction to barbaric and objectionable
modes of punishment, or to both. Id at 840-44. Early congressional intent seemed to suggest
that the cruel and unusual punishment clause was directed at prohibiting certain methods
of punishment. 1 Annals of Cong 782-83 (1789).
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The United States Supreme Court was not faced with a direct
interpretation of the cruel and unusual punishments clause until
1879 in the case of Wilkerson v Utah.7 In Wilkerson, the Court
unanimously upheld a sentence of public execution imposed pursu-
ant to a conviction for premeditated murder.4 Justice Clifford,
writing for the Court, concluded that it was difficult to determine
with exactness the scope of the constitutional provision prohibiting
cruel and'unusual punishments.49 However, he affirmed that pun-
ishments of torture or others of the same sort were prohibited by
the Eighth Amendment." The Court based its affirmance of the
execution on historically traditional punishments accepted within
the Utah territories, and also the then-current writings on capital
punishment.51
In 1890, the Court again faced a challenge brought under the
Eighth Amendment in the case of In Re Kemmler.5 2 The Court
held in Kemmler that electrocution was a permissible mode of
punishment.5 3 The condemned prisoner sought to void the execu-
tion warrant through his claim that death inflicted by electricity
was cruel and unusual. 54 The Court reasoned that because the
state legislature had determined that execution by electricity did
not inflict cruel and unusual punishment, the punishment, albeit
Professor Granucci contended that the American colonists misinterpreted the English Bill
of Rights. Granucci, 57 Cal L Rev at 847 (cited in note 41). He asserted that the American
drafters omitted a prohibition on excessive punishments and adopted instead the prohibi-
tion of cruel methods of punishment. Id. English Law, at that time, never prohibited cruel
methods of punishment. Id. To the contrary, the English law permitted one to be beheaded
or quartered until it was statutorily repealed in 1870. 33 & 34 Vic, c 23, § 31 (1870). The
burning of female offenders continued until repealed in 1790. 30 Geo 3, c 48 (1790).
47. 99 US 130 (1879). The defendant was convicted of premeditated murder and
sought to invalidate his sentence of public execution on the grounds that it was cruel and
unusual. Wilkerson, 99 US at 132-34.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id at 135-36. The Court held that unnecessary cruelty was no more permissible
than was torture. Id. The Court stated that torture inflicted on a prisoner was inherently
prohibited by the Constitution. Id. Moreover, the Court reasoned that unnecessary cruelty
in the imposition of punishment was analogous to torture; therefore, unnecessary cruelty
was also prohibited. Id.
51. Id. The Court was cautious of deciding the case purely on traditional practice,
hence their examination of various writings regarding capital punishment. Id. Justice Clif-
ford relied upon many writings which included: Thomas F. Simmons, Remarks on the Con-
sitution and Practice of Courts-Martials § 645 at 86 (J. Murray, 5th ed 1863); Cooley, Con-
stitutional Limimitations 408 (Little, Brown and Co., 4th ed 1874); and Francis Wharton,
Criminal Law, § 3405 (Lawyer's Co-op, 7th ed).
52. 136 US 436 (1890).
53. Kemmler, 136 US at 446, 447.
54. Id at 439-41.
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unusual, was constitutional. 5 Two years later in the case of O'Neil
v Vermont,56 the Court upheld the imposition of a fifty-four-year
confinement at hard labor sentence on a person found guilty of a
multitude of "liquor violations. ' 57 The defendant could not pay
the statutory fines of $6,140.58 Justice Field, joined by Justices
Harlan and Brewer, dissented.5 The dissent contended that not
only did the Eighth Amendment apply to the states, but Vermont
also violated O'Neil's Eighth Amendment rights by imposing a
punishment greatly disproportionate to the offenses charged.,
The dissenting approach advocated in O'Neil became the major-
ity opinion eighteen years later in the landmark case of Weems v
United States.6 1 Weems, a government official, was convicted of
falsifying a public document and sentenced to fifteen years at hard
55. Id at 449. The Court deferred to the state legislature a presumption that the state
had a say in the manner of execution, that it was possessed of the facts when it decided
upon this, and that the desired result was that death was to be inflicted by electrocution
because it was instantaneous and was more humane. Id at 446, 447.
The Court relied heavily upon its earlier decision in Wilkerson and added to the earlier
opinion that a "punishment is not necessarily unconstitutional simply because it is unusual,
so long as the legislature had a humane purpose (desire to execute with minimum pain) in
selecting it." Id at 443-48. The prisoner asserted that under the Fourteenth Amendment
provision, which forbids a state to make or enforce any law "which shall abridge the rights
and privileges of any citizen," cruel and unusual punishment was prohibited. Id at 446. The
Court held that the Eighth Amendment was not applicable to the states. Moreover, the
Court rejected the prisoner's assertion and concluded that the execution warrant was not an
abridgement of the prisoner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, nor was it a depri-
vation of due process. Id at 446-49.
56. 144 US 323 (1892). The defendant was found guilty of 307 liquor violations.
O'Neil, 144 US at 323. Each offense carried a fine of $20.00 which, when totalled, amounted
to $6,140. Id. O'Neil was also taxed for court costs of $497.96 Id. The defendant could not
pay the fines and was sentenced to fifty-four years at hard labor. Id. The Court upheld the
sentence primarily on the reasoning that it would "scarcely be competent for a person to
assail the constitutionality of a statute prescribing punishment for burglary, on the grounds
that he had committed so many burglaries that if punishment for each were inflicted on
him, he might be kept for life." Id at 331. Only if the penalty for a single offense was unrea-
sonably severe could there be a violation. Id.
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, counsel for O'Neil raised for the first time a
claim of cruel and unusual punishment because of the disparity between the offense and the
punishment. Id at 331-32. Justice Blatchford refused to consider the claim because it had
not been assigned as error at the proper time and because it had not been discussed in the
briefs. Id. The majority went on to add that, even if the contention had been properly
raised, the Eighth Amendment only restricted the federal government and did not apply to
the state of Vermont. Id.
57. Id at 323-26.
58. Id at 336. See note 56.
59. O'Neil, 144 US at 337.
60. Id at 337-66.
61. 217 US 349 (1910).
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labor.6 2 The Court struck down the penalty imposed on Weems,
holding that the punishment was excessive.6 3 The Court concluded
that excessive punishments were as violative of the Eighth Amend-
ment as were those found to be inherently cruel." In 1947, the
court in Louisiana v Resweber"5 upheld a state's reissuance of an
execution warrant after the first attempted electrocution failed to
kill the prisoner because of a mechanical malfunction. The pris-
oner contended that a second attempt would violate his Eighth
Amendment rights forbidding cruel and unusual punishment.
67
The Court found that electrocution as a mode of punishment was
promulgated by the state legislature as a more humane means of
punishment.6 Furthermore, by relying on language from Kemmler,
the Court found no constitutional violation. 9 More importantly,
however, the Court suggested for the first time that a standard of
intent must be evident to have an Eighth Amendment claim.
7 0
After Resweber, the Court was required to further explain and
define cruel and unusual punishment in Trop v Dulles71 and
62. Weems, 217 US at 362-65. Weems was convicted by a Philippine Court of Law
under the Philippine Bill of Rights; however, the Court determined that it was borrowed
from the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and had the same meaning.
Id at 367.
The statute also imposed the perpetual attachment of a ball and chain to Weems' ankles,
and imposed severely on personal rights including loss of marital and parental rights, the
inability to pass property inter vivos, and being subjected to surveillance for life. Id at 364.
Jurisdiction was obtained over Weems by his being a United States government employee
working within a United States-controlled territory. Id at 349-50.
63. Id at 381.
64. Id at 380-82. The Court held the punishment to be excessive and stated that the
"precept of justice, was that punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to
the offense." Id at 353.
65. 329 US 459 (1947).
66. Resweber, 329 US at 459. Officials found that current passed through Francis'
body, but not in an amount sufficient to cause his death. Id at 461.
67. Id.
68. Id at 460-65. The Court concluded the second attempt was not constitutionally
invalid and reasoned that the "fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented consummation
of the sentence cannot add an element of cruelty to the subsequent sentence." Id at 464.
69. Id at 463. The Court relied on language in Kemmler, which stated that punish-
ment legislatively decided upon will not be found to be unconstitutional if it was enacted
with a desire for humaneness. Id, citing Kemmler, 136 US at 446. By revisiting Kemmler,
the Court impliedly reaffirmed the role of historical traditions in examining cruel and un-
usual punishment cases. Resweber, 329 US at 463.
70. Resweber, 329 US at 463. Justice Reed wrote: "Prohibition against the wanton
infliction of pain has come into our law from the Bills of Rights of 1688 [sic]." Id. Justice
Reed, when analyzing the prisoner's claim under the scope of the Eighth Amendment, con-
cluded that there was no element of cruelty because there was "no purpose to inflict unnec-
essary pain . . ." Id at 464.
71. 356 US 86 (1958). In Trop, the sentence imposed on the defendant resulted in the
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Robinson v California. Both cases, for the first time, stated that
specific non-death penalty punishments could be found to violate
the Eighth Amendment.7 Particularly noteworthy in both cases
was the Court's expansion of not only the definition of cruel and
unusual punishment, but also the conditions in which violations
will be found to have occurred. 74 Furthermore, the Court in Robin-
son definitively held that the Eighth Amendment does apply to the
states through the Fourteenth Amendment.7 5 The expansive hold-
ings of Trop and Robinson reflected the Court's departure from
reliance upon historical and traditional punishments and illus-
trated the Court's new-found reasoning that "what was once per-
missible at one time in our nation's history, [is] not necessarily
permissible today.
7 6
In Estelle v Gamble,77 the Court first acknowledged that the
Eighth Amendment provision prohibiting cruel and unusual pun-
ishment could be applied to some deprivations that were not spe-
loss of his American citizenship. Trop, 356 US at 86. The Court held that the punishment
violated the Eighth Amendment and reasoned that the Eighth Amendment must draw its
"meaning from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Id at 101. The Court's conclusion marked a departure from reliance upon the historical
traditions cited in Kemmler and Francis. Id. See notes 52 and 69.
72. 370 US 660 (1962). In Robinson, the state passed a law which declared drug ad-
diction to be illegal. Robinson, 370 US at 660. The defendant was convicted of being a drug
addict, without possession of a drug, and was sentenced to prison. Id. The Court held that
the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment. Id at 666.
73. See Trop, 356 US at 114, and Robinson, 370 US at 666.
74. In Trop, Chief Justice Warren wrote that the Eighth Amendment must draw its
meaning from "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Trop, 356 US at 101.
Similar language is found in Robinson, where Justice Stewart wrote, "The cruel and un-
usual punishment clause is not a static concept, but one that must be continually re-ex-
amined in the light of contemporary human knowledge." Robinson, 370 US at 666.
Justice Douglas, concurring in Robinson, agreed with Justice Stewart and wrote, "The
principle that would deny the power to exact capital punishment for a petty crime would
also deny the power to punish a person by fine or imprisonment for being 'sick.'" Id at 676.
75. Robinson, 370 US at 666.
76. Furman v Georgid, 408 US 238 (1972). The Court in Furman declared the death
penalty unconstitutional. Furman, 408 US at 238. Justice Marshall, in his concurrence, re-
lied heavily upon the reasoning found in Trop and Robinson, which signaled an end to the
historical traditional examination and embraced the concept that the Eighth Amendment
must be viewed in light of modern standards of decency. Id.
77. 429 US 97 (1976). In Estelle, a prisoner working within the prison system was
injured when a six-hundred pound bale of cotton fell on him. Estelle, 429 US at 99. Subse-
quent to his injury, the prisoner contended that he received inadequate medical treatment
which unnecessarily inflicted additional pain on him. Id. The Court rejected the claim and
held that the prisoner had failed to show that prison officials had been "deliberately indif-
ferent" in giving the prisoner medical care, thus, the prison officials had not unnecessarily or
wantonly inflicted pain. Id at 106.
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cifically part of the sentence, but were suffered during imprison-
ment.78 Gamble, a prisoner, brought a complaint alleging that
subsequent to an injury he received while working, the prison
failed to provide him with adequate medical care, thus violating
his Eighth Amendment rights.7 9 The Court reaffirmed the states'
obligation to provide prisoners with adequate medical care.80 How-
ever, the Court rejected Gamble's constitutional challenge by hold-
ing that in order to state a valid constitutional claim, a "prisoner
must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence de-
liberate indifference .. . ."I" The Court concluded that only a
showing of deliberate indifference on the part of the prison officials
could "offend the evolving standards of decency in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. '82 This conclusion firmly established the
Court's belief that an inquiry into the state-of-mind of prison offi-
cials was necessary for a successful Eighth Amendment challenge.83
The Court defined this inquiry as whether pain or punishment was
unnecessarily or wantonly inflicted through deliberate indifference
on the part of prison officials.8 '
The Court next confronted an Eighth Amendment challenge to a
prison condition in Rhodes v Chapman.5 Two prisoners at an
Ohio correctional facility contended that the housing of two pris-
oners in a cell designed for one prisoner constituted cruel and un-
usual punishment.86 The Court rejected the prisoners' constitu-
tional claim, holding that double-ceiling did not reach the level of
78. Id at 98.
79. Id. Gamble brought the action pursuant to 42 USC § 1983. Id. For the text of
Section 1983, see note 2.
80. Estelle, 429 US at 98.
81. Id at 106.
82. Id. Justice Marshall reasoned that "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of a prisoner constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Id at 104.
Justice Marshall was careful to point out that all citizens are subjected to the risk of medi-
cal malpractice, and not all medical malpractice claims brought by prisoners will be Eighth
Amendment violations. Id at 104-06. Only malpractice which constituted an unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain will be determined to have violated the Eighth Amendment.
Id.
83. Id at 105, 106. It is noteworthy that disagreement among the Court was already
developing at this time in the Court's use and requirement of intent. Id at 116.
Justice Stevens developed a contrary opinion in his dissent that the "Court improperly
attaches significance to the subjective motivation of the Defendant as a criterion for deter-
mining whether cruel and unusual punishment has been inflicted." Id. The dissent relied
upon Justice Burton's dissenting opinion in Resweber. "The intent of the executioner can-
not lessen the torture or excuse the result." Resweber, 329 US at 477.
84. Estelle, 429 US at 104-06.
85. 452 US 337 (1981).
86. Rhodes, 452 US at 337.
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deprivation sufficiently serious enough to form the basis of an
Eighth Amendment violation.87 The holding in Rhodes was ulti-
mately decided on an objective inquiry, which was defined by the
Court as whether the deprivations or conditions complained-of
reached a sufficiently serious level to implicate the Eighth Amend-
ment.8 The Court concluded that double-celling never reached the
"constitutional minima" to satisfy the objective inquiry, thus a
subjective inquiry as to the state-of-mind of the prison officials was
not required.89
After establishing a subjective inquiry in Estelle and an objec-
tive inquiry in Rhodes, the Court expanded the subjective inquiry
with its decision in Whitley.90 In Whitley, a prisoner was shot by a
prison guard in the course of attempting to quell a prison riot.91
The Court reaffirmed that in order to make out an Eighth Amend-
ment violation, the prisoner must show more than a lack of due
care. Rather, the prisoner must show that pain was wantonly and
unnecessarily inflicted through some level of culpable intent on the
part of prison officials.92 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
predicated the infliction of unnecessary and wanton pain as ulti-
mately turning on whether "force was applied in a good faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or whether it was meted out mali-
ciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."9 3 In
87. Id at 348.
88. Id at 347, 349.
89. Id at 348. In his opinion, Justice Powell rejected the use of the expert opinion in
determining whether prison conditions "suffice to establish contemporary standards of de-
cency." Id. To the contrary, Justice Powell would rather define contemporary standards of
decency by "the public attitudes toward a given sanction." Id at 348, 349.
It is extremely important to understand the potential impact the Rhodes decision had
upon state correctional facilities. Almost all the states were faced with overcrowded condi-
tions, and the interest in whether or not overcrowding would be deemed unconstitutional
was evidenced by thirty-six states and the United States Virgin Islands submitting amici
curiae briefs urging the Court to find overcrowding constitutional. Id at 338, 339.
The Court never reached a subjective inquiry since the claim failed at the objective in-
quiry level of whether the confinement conditions reached a level serious enough to impli-
cate the Eighth Amendment. Id at 346-49.
90. See note 13 for the facts of Whitley.
91. Whitley, 475 US at 312. The inmate brought the action pursuant to 42 USC §
1983. Id. For the text of Section 1983, see note 2.
92. Whitley, 475 US at 320.
93. Id at 320-21. Justice O'Connor distinguished the Estelle intent standard of "de-
liberate indifference" from the Whitley standard of "maliciously or sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm." Id. She reasoned that a deliberate indifference standard was ap-
propriate in medical or physical claims since the Court is not usually balancing the compet-
ing interests of the state in its concerns for prison safety. Id at 320. However, when con-
fronted with a realistic threat of unrest and prison integrity, the deliberate indifference
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rejecting the prisoner's claim, the Court concluded that the pain
inflicted on the prisoner was a result of a "good faith effort" on the
part of prison officials to restore order, and was not inflicted "mali-
ciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm."94 The
Wilson decision is not a departure from precedent, but is an effort
by the Court to marshal the pertinent and precedent case law in an
attempt to mandate a more judicious and efficient process in which
to decide confinement conditions claims.
After Rhodes, the objective inquiry of whether the deprivations
complained-of reached a sufficient level to implicate the Eighth
Amendment became firmly entrenched in case law.95 The second
inquiry, an examination into the state-of-mind on the part of the
prison officials, led courts to a myriad of decisions in their at-
tempts to pin down the proper intent standard.' Most courts that
applied a subjective test agreed that conduct must involve more
standard does not appropriately comprehend the importance of competing interests, and by
applying such a standard the Court is placed in a position as Monday-morning quarterback.
Id.
94. Id at 326. Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined, dissented from the majority opinion. Id at 328. The dissent opined that the majority
improperly placed the onerous burden of proving intent on the prisoner. Id. The dissenting
Justices concluded that precedent has never imposed an expressed intent requirement;
rather, the prisoner must only show that the pain was unnecessarily or wantonly inflicted.
Id. The dissent cited Trop and Robinson in its argument that the Eighth Amendment was
not measured by intent on the part of the prison officials, but by "evolving standards of
decency." Id.
95. Wilson, 111 S Ct 2321 (1991). Justice Scalia found that the objective inquiry was
a preliminary one and was distinctly different from the state-of-mind (subjective) inquiry.
Id.
Justice White would hold that Rhodes was the only case needed to decide this case since
Rhodes detailed an objective inquiry, and the concurrence believed this to be the only in-
quiry required. Id at 2329-30.
96. Id at 2328. The majority was concerned that the appellate court applied the
Whitley standard (obduracy and wantonness requires behavior marked by persistent mali-
cious cruelty) when it should have applied the Estelle standard (wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain marked by deliberate indifference on the part of the prison official). Id.
It is clear that the appellate court was not aware of the importance of the state-of-mind
inquiry. The Sixth Circuit relied upon Birrell v Brown, 867 F2d 956 (6th Cir 1989), in apply-
ing the intent test. Wilson, 893 F2d at 865. The appellate court, after analyzing Birrell, held
that the recklessness standard articulated in Birrell was similar to the obduracy and wan-
tonness standard articulated in Whitley, since both could be reconciled as merely semantic
problems. Id. This error led the Sixth Circuit to mistakenly apply the Whitley standard to
the instant case. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2328.
Justice White emphatically pointed out that many lower courts failed to make the subjec-
tive inquiry and based their decision solely upon the objective component. Id at 2330. See,
for example, Tillery v Owens, 907 F2d 418, 426-28 (3d Cir 1990); Foulds v Corley, 833 F2d
52, 54-55 (5th Cir 1987); French v Owens, 777 F2d 1250, 1252-54 (7th Cir 1985); Hoptowit v
Spellman, 753 F2d 779, 784 (9th Cir 1985).
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than an ordinary lack of due care to implicate the Eighth Amend-
ment. However, these courts were unsure of which standard to use
and whether differing circumstances called for different stan-
dards.9 It was under this backdrop that Justice Scalia formulated
the issues in Wilson as "whether a prisoner claiming that condi-
tions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment
must show a culpable state of mind on the part of prison officials
and, if so, what state of mind is required." '98 In the present case,
Justice Scalia predicated the majority opinion on two crucial deter-
minations. The first was the majority's seminal finding that con-
finement conditions do not constitute punishment formally meted
out by statute or judicial resolve, thus some mental element must
be attributable to the offending official before the Eighth Amend-
ment could be implicated. 9 Congruent with this finding, the Court
concluded that confinement conditions were materially synony-
mous with deprivations of inadequate medical care, and applied
the standard of intent articulated in Estelle.100 This conclusion
proves significant in that it serves to derail much of the conflict
between Estelle, Rhodes, and Whitley.'0'
97. See note 96 and accompanying text.
98. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2322.
99. Id at 2325. Justice Scalia relied upon the historical connotation of the word pun-
ishment. "The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act . . . . This is what the word
means today; it is what the word meant in the eighteenth century." Id. Justice Scalia fur-
ther reasoned that, "If a guard accidently stepped on a prisoner's toe and broke it, this
would not be punishment in anything like the accepted meaning of the word, whether we
consult the usage of 1791, or 1868, or 1985." Id, citing Duckworth v Franzer, 780 F2d 645,
652 (7th Cir 1985).
Judge Friendly also wrote: "The thread common to all Eighth Amendment cases is that
'punishment' has been deliberately administered for a penal or disciplinary purpose." John-
son v Glick, 481 F2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir 1973).
Justice Scalia opined that since the confinement conditions are not part of the formal
punishment, some element of intent to cause pain on the part of the prison officials must be
present in order to further an Eighth Amendment claim. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2325.
100. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2326-27. The Court stated: "Whether one characterizes the
treatment received by the prisoner as inhumane conditions of confinement, a failure to at-
tend to his medical needs, or a combination of both, it is appropriate to apply the deliberate
indifference standard articulated in Estelle." Id at 2327.
The Court also relied on precedent where lower courts applied the Estelle standard to
confinement conditions cases. See, for example, Lopez v Robinson, 914 F2d 486, 492 (4th Cir
1990) (deliberate indifference standard applied to confinement conditions case); Givens v
Jones, 900 F2d 1229, 1234 (8th Cir 1990) (deliberate indifference standard applied); and
Cortes-Quinones v Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F2d 556, 558 (1st Cir 1988) (deliberate indiffer-
ence standard applied to claim brought by prisoner's family when murdered by another
prisoner).
101. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2324-26. By aligning confinement conditions cases with in-
adequate medical care cases, the Court neatly applied the deliberate indifference standard.
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The second crucial finding was that wantonness is a transmuta-
ble term, the definition of which can vary as differing circum-
stances or constraints are placed upon the prison officials.10 2 The
Court stated that the wanton infliction of pain could be violative of
the Eighth Amendment by applying differing standards of intent
based upon the circumstances and constraints faced by prison offi-
cials.10 3 The Court described the differing degrees of intent as be-
ing determined by the kind of conduct against which an Eighth
Amendment claim was founded.10 4 The Court explained that the
"maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm"
standard articulated in Whitley was the proper standard when
prison officials were acting in response to a prison disturbance
which required quick and decisive action in order to safeguard the
integrity of the prison. 0 5
The prison official's actions, wrote Justice O'Connor in Whitley,
are "necessarily taken in haste, under pressure, and require bal-
ancing competing institutional concerns with the safety of the
prison staff or other inmates." 06 On the other hand, the state's
responsibility to provide adequate confinement conditions does not
generally clash with "equally important governmental responsibili-
ties." Consequently, deliberate indifference to a prisoner's inhu-
mane conditions of confinement can typically be established or dis-
proved without the necessity of balancing competing institutional
concerns for the safety of the prison staff or other inmates.
10 7
This prevents the courts from later confusing the Estelle standard from the Whitley stan-
dard (as did the Sixth Circuit) and leaves both cases mutually amicable. Id.
Once the Court placed confinement conditions cases under Estelle, it negated the concur-
rence's criticism that the majority was not following precedent. The concurrence opined that
confinement conditions are part of formally meted out punishment, thus requiring only an
objective determination pursuant to Rhodes. Id at 2329-30. However, because the majority
decided that confinement conditions cases are not part of the punishment, and that some
mental element must be attributable, the courts must look beyond Rhodes to apply the
appropriate subjective test. Id at 2324-25.
102. Id at 2326. This determination is almost a direct affirmance of Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Whitley, in which she distinguished the deliberate indifference stan-
dard from the sadistically or maliciously inflicted standard. See note 93 and accompanying
text.
The majority agreed with Justice O'Connor in that varying constraints placed upon the
prison officials will cause the standard of intent to fluctuate with the circumstances. Wilson,
111 S Ct at 2326.
103. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2326. See also note 93 and accompanying text.
104. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2326, citing Whitley, 475 US at 320.
105. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2326.
106. Whitley, 475 US at 320. See also note 93 and accompanying text.
107. Whitley, 475 US at 320.
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In summary, the Court will apply the deliberate indifference
standard when faced with a confinement conditions claim because
the state's responsibility to provide adequate conditions is para-
mount to any other competing interests.108 When faced with an
Eighth Amendment claim originating from a use-of-force action
taken by prison officials to restore order, the Court will apply the
persistent malicious cruelty standard because the officials are act-
ing under extreme circumstances and must balance the gravity of
the actions taken against the need for prison integrity and safe-
guarding the other prisoners."'
The Court has in effect established a two-prong inquiry for
Eighth Amendment confinement conditions cases. The first prong
consists of a judicial examination into the objective component of
the Eighth Amendment claim. 10 The inquiry will focus on whether
the confinement conditions reach a sufficiently serious enough level
to implicate the Eighth Amendment."" The result is that if a court
concludes that the confinement conditions satisfy the Eighth
Amendment, the subjective inquiry is never reached. 1 ' By con-
trast, if a court determines that the confinement conditions are vi-
olative of the Eighth Amendment, the court must then apply the
appropriate subjective test articulated in Estelle and Whitley to
determine if the prisoner can demonstrate that the prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to the violative conditions. 1 3 At a
minimum, the Wilson Court concluded that a prisoner must
demonstrate that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference." 4
The creation of the two-prong inquiry gives the courts an effi-
cient tool which, when properly wielded, will simplify the judicial
process when faced with a confinement conditions claim and will
ensure more symmetrical results. A subjective inquiry prevents the
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2324. Justice Scalia distinguished Rhodes as an objective
test in contrast to Estelle and Whitley, which were subjective tests. Id.
111. Id, citing Rhodes, 452 US at 347-49.
112. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2327. Justice Scalia defined the objective prong as a "pre-
liminary matter" that must be addressed prior to the state-of-mind inquiry. Id. Justice
Scalia further stated that Rhodes was based upon an objective inquiry, and thus the subjec-
tive inquiry was never reached. Id at 2324-27.
113. Id at 2323, citing Estelle, 429 US at 106.
114. Wilson, 111 S Ct at 2327.
Vol. 30:10051022
1992 Recent Decisions 1023
courts from relying solely on objective standards, which in Eighth
Amendment claims are often subject to the sitting court's predilec-
tions and ideology.
Douglas Hottle

